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 Numerous studies demonstrate that compulsive checking is associated with reduced 
memory confidence (Muller & Roberts, 2005; Woods, Vivea, Chambless, & Bayen, 2003).  
Some researchers have shown that the act of repeated checking may result in changes in 
encoding and subsequently reduced confidence in memory (Radomsky, Rachman, & Hammond, 
2001; Van den Hout & Kindt, 2004).  It was therefore hypothesized that instructions to focus 
attention on one’s surroundings as well as one’s actions during a repeated checking task may 
attenuate decreases in memory confidence.  Prior to a repeated checking task, 64 participants 
were instructed to focus not only on their actions but also on their surroundings (Peripheral 
condition), and 66 participants were instructed to focus only on their actions (Central condition).  
Contrary to expectations, compared with those in the central condition, participants in the 
peripheral condition did not report greater memory confidence, but did however have a more 
accurate memory.  Furthermore, this effect was largest for participants scoring high on a measure 
of compulsive checking.  Results are discussed in terms of cognitive models of OCD and 
compulsive checking. 
 




Attentional Focus During Repeated Checking Influences Memory but Not Metamemory 
 
 A common manifestation of obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD) is compulsive 
checking (Stein, Rode, Anderson, & Walker, 1997; Taylor, 2002), which is characterized by the 
urge to repeatedly verify that an action aimed to prevent harm has been completed (Rachman & 
Hodgson, 1980).  It has been argued that compulsive checking occurs as a result of poor 
memory, however research to date has not consistently demonstrated that this is the case.   
Though some investigators have demonstrated that clinical and non-clinical checkers have 
impaired memory for actions (Rubenstein, Peynircioglu, Chambless, & Pigott, 1993; Sher, Frost 
& Otto, 1983; Sher, Mann, & Frost, 1984; Sher, Frost, Kushner, Crews & Alexander, 1989), 
others have not detected this impairment (Tallis, Pratt, & Jamani, 1999).  Several reviews of 
memory in OCD suggest that OCD may be related to deficits in memory for actions as well as 
visual memory, although all of these emphasize the inconsistencies in the literature (Coles & 
Heimberg, 2002; Greisberg & McKay, 2003; Muller & Roberts, 2005; Tallis, 1997).   
Further complicating the current understanding of memory in OCD is the fact that some 
researchers have not found memory deficits under threat relevant conditions, when the to-be-
remembered material is related to the individual’s fear (Ceschi, Van der Linden, Dunker, 
Perroud, & Brédart, 2003; Foa, Amir, Gershuny, Molnar, & Kozak, 1997; Radomsky & 
Rachman, 1999; Radomsky, Rachman, & Hammond, 2001).  In fact, several studies have 
actually demonstrated that under personally relevant or anxiety provoking circumstances, 
individuals with symptoms of OCD actually have a more accurate memory, particularly for 
threat relevant information (Ceschi et al., 2003; Constans, Foa, Franklin, & Mathews, 1995; 
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Radomsky & Rachman, 1999; Radomsky et al., 2001; Tolin, Abramowitz, Brigidi, Amir, Street, 
& Foa, 2001; Wilhelm, McNally, Baer, & Florin, 1996).   
Although the literature related to actual memory is relatively inconsistent, one 
increasingly common finding is that individuals who compulsively check tend to report less 
confidence in their memory for checking than individuals who do not compulsively check (Foa 
et al., 1997; MacDonald, Antony, MacLeod, & Richter, 1997; McNally & Kohlbeck, 1993; Tolin 
et al., 2001; Zitterl, Urban, Linzmayer, Aigner, Demal, Semler, & Zitterl-Eglseer, 2001), 
although a few studies have not found significant differences between checkers and non-checkers 
(e.g., Tallis et al., 1999).  Recent research suggests that the declines in memory confidence 
following repeated checking, at least in non-clinical samples, are larger than the changes in 
memory accuracy that have been observed (Coles, Radomsky, & Horng, in press; Radomsky, 
Gilchrist & Dussault, in press; Van den Hout & Kindt, 2004), and that decreases in memory 
confidence appear to be most salient under conditions of high responsibility (Radomsky et al., 
2001).  It may be that compulsive checkers do not have a worse memory than others, but rather 
are less confident in their memory. 
Van den Hout and Kindt (2003a; 2003b; see 2004 for a review) recently demonstrated 
that decreases in memory confidence can be induced in non-checkers.  They examined if low 
memory confidence was produced by increases in the familiarity of the checking event, by 
asking undergraduate students to repeatedly turn on, turn off, and check random combinations of 
either computer simulated light bulbs or gas rings on a virtual stove.  In the “irrelevant checking” 
condition participants turned on, turned off, and checked the light bulbs 20 times, and then on the 
last trial, participants checked the stove.  In the “relevant checking” condition participants turned 
on, turned off, and checked the stove 20 times and also checked the stove on the last trial.  Under 
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the “relevant checking” condition, participants reported significantly decreased vividness and 
detail of, and confidence in memory compared to participants in the “irrelevant checking” 
condition.  These results have been replicated by Radomsky and colleagues (2006) and Coles 
and colleagues (2006) under conditions of real perceived threat and responsibility in a 
functioning kitchen.  In addition to the large declines in confidence, vividness and detail, these 
more recent studies also found small declines in memory accuracy.  Van den Hout and Kindt 
(2004) argued that the conditions of high familiarity, such as those produced by the “relevant 
checking” condition in their study, inhibited processing of the perceptual features of a stimulus 
which in turn decreased the vividness and detail of later recollections, and subsequently deflated 
the confidence in that recollection.  
An alternate, although not incompatible hypothesis as to why decrements in memory 
confidence occur is that under conditions of high anxiety, individuals tend to focus on threat-
relevant cues and ignore threat-irrelevant cues.  This in turn leads to decreased memory 
vividness and detail, and ultimately to decreased memory confidence (Rachman, 2002; 
Radomsky et al., 2001).   More specifically, according to Rachman’s model of compulsive 
checking (2002), high perceived responsibility, multiplied by high perceived seriousness and 
probability of harm occurring, will lead to increased arousal which will impair the vividness and 
detail of the encoded checking event, leading to mistrust in memory.  Thus, according to this 
model, decreases in memory confidence may be observed in compulsive checkers even during an 
initial check, due to the inflated beliefs of responsibility and harm.  Importantly, both models 
suggest that less detailed encoding of the checking event leads to decreased vividness and detail, 
which, in turn lead to decreased memory confidence.   
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It follows from these models that increasing the amount of detail encoded (e.g., increased 
processing of perceptual features according to Van den Hout and Kindt, or increased processing 
of threat-irrelevant cues according to Radomsky and colleagues (2001)) may attenuate these 
declines in memory confidence.   Not only would demonstrating that increased encoding of 
detail attenuates declines in memory confidence add support to these theories of how repeated 
checking affects memory and meta-memory, this finding could also offer clinicians additional 
tools in the cognitive-behavioural treatment of compulsive checking. 
One way to increase the amount of detail encoded during a repeated checking task is to 
instruct participants not only to attend to the stimulus being checked, but also to the surrounding 
(peripheral) details of the checking environment.  The purpose of this study is to examine if the 
increased encoding of peripheral details will lead to attenuated decreases in memory confidence 
in individuals instructed to repeatedly check.  It was predicted that increasing the amount of 
detail encoded while checking would reduce the decline in memory confidence.   Because 
previous studies have only investigated this phenomenon in student samples, we also divided our 
sample into two groups:  individuals with high levels of compulsive checking and those with 
normative levels of checking to determine a) if high checkers have lower memory confidence 
even following an initial check as proposed by Rachman (2002), b) if the effect of repeated 
checking on memory confidence is stronger in high checkers and c) if the effect of peripheral 
focus has a larger effect on high checkers compared to low checkers.   
Methods 
Participants 
Participants (n =152) were recruited from undergraduate psychology classes at Concordia 
University, Montreal Canada.  Participants were told that the study would take approximately 
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one hour to complete, and had their name entered in a draw to win one of five cash prizes, 
ranging from $50 to $250, in exchange for participating.  Twelve participants were removed 
from analyses because of incomplete or missing data.  One half of the sample was randomly 
assigned to a peripheral focus condition, while those remaining were assigned to a central focus 
condition (see below).  
At the end of the study, participants were further subdivided into high and low checking 
groups. Group assignment was based on previously established scores on the Vancouver 
Obsessive Compulsive Inventory (VOCI) checking subscale for OCD and community samples 
(Thordarson, et al., 2004; see below).  There were fourteen high checkers in each of the 
peripheral and central conditions, 54 low checkers in the central condition and 52 low checkers 
in the peripheral condition.  Six participants were eliminated from the analysis due to the fact 
that their scores fell outside the cut-off scores for both checking groups.    
 The mean age of participants was 24.28 (SD = 6.41) years.  A 2-way ANOVA with focus 
condition and checking group as between-participant factors determined that there were no 
significant age differences between the groups, Fs (1, 130) < 2.21, n.s., η2p =  .02, confirming the 
random assignment of our participants.  The majority of our participants were female, 
comprising 73.13% of our sample.  Random assignment was once more demonstrated by the 




The Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996) is a 21-item 
frequently used self-report measure assessing symptoms of depression.  The scale exhibits 
excellent reliability and validity (Beck et al., 1996).  The internal consistency of the BDI-II in the 
current samples was also excellent, α = .92. 
Anxiety 
The Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI; Beck, Epstein, Brown, & Steer, 1988) is a 21-item 
frequently used self-report measure assessing general symptoms of anxiety.  The scale exhibits 
excellent internal consistency in clinical and student samples and moderate test-retest reliability 
(Creamer, Foran, & Bell, 1995; Fydrich, Dowdall, & Chambless, 1992).  The divergent and 
convergent validity of the BAI is also excellent (Creamer et al., 1995; Fydrich et al., 1992).  The 
internal consistency of the BAI in the current samples was excellent, α = .91.   
OC Symptoms 
 The VOCI (Thordarson et al., 2004) is a 55-item self-report measure assessing a variety 
of symptoms associated with OCD.  The scale has 6 subscales, each measuring a different 
symptom type.   Validation of the questionnaire indicates that the scale has good internal 
consistency and acceptable test-retest reliability, as well as acceptable convergent and divergent 
validity in a student sample (Radomsky, Ouimet, Ashbaugh, Lavoie, Parrish, & O’Connor, in 
press; Thordarson et al., 2004).  For the purposes of this study, the means for individuals with 
OCD and the community sample for theVOCI checking subscale, as established during the initial 
validation of the study (Thordarson et al., 2004), were used to divide the sample into high and 
low checkers.  The internal consistency of the 6-item checking subscale in the current sample 
was excellent, α = .94, and consistent with previously reported levels of internal consistency 
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(Radomsky et al., in press; Thordarson et al., 2004).  In the initial validation, individuals with 
OCD scored 12.32 (SD = 8.62) on the checking subscale, whereas students scored 3.16 (SD = 
4.27), and the community sample scored 0.79 (SD = 1.51) (Thordarson et al., 2004).  In this 
study, any participant scoring at or above the reported mean of the OCD group minus one 
standard deviation (e.g., scores greater than or equal to 3.7) was classified as a high checker. To 
reduce overlap between the high and low checkers, the reported community sample mean was 
used to define the low checkers.  Thus, any participant scoring at or lower than the published 
mean of the community sample plus one standard deviation (e.g., a score less than or equal to 
1.94) was classified as a low checker. 
Memory Accuracy 
 Memory accuracy was assessed following a single checking trial and following a 
repeated checking trial.  For the single checking trial, participants were asked to recall which 
stove knob they checked first and which knob they checked second (as described below, 
participants were required to check random combinations of 2 out of 6 knobs).  For the repeated 
checking trials, memory accuracy was divided into a number of subcategories.  Participants were 
asked to recall which knob they checked first and second on the last trial.  In addition to this 
main variable of interest, we also examined the effect of our focus manipulation on items 
increasingly peripheral to the checking event.  Participants were asked to recall items in the room 
that were central to the checking task, but not the knobs themselves.  Questions related to other 
central items included a) Which knob did not click loudly?, b) Did any burners glow red/orange 
while you were in the kitchen?, and c) Did the stove beep at anytime?.  Participants were also 
asked to recall peripheral items from the room that were not related to the check.  Questions 
related to peripheral items included a) What kind of food or drink was by the stove?, b) How 
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many electrical plugs were on the stove?, c) What color was the tea towel on the stove?, d) What 
pattern was on the tea pot?, and e) How many cups were there in the sink?   Memory accuracy 
for each category was calculated as the percentage of items correctly recalled.  
Memory Confidence 
For each item, participants were asked to rate how confident they were that their memory 
was accurate from 0 (not at all confident) to 100 (extremely confident).  Memory confidence was 
calculated for each category by computing the mean confidence score for items contributing to a 
specific memory accuracy score.   
Attention 
 As a manipulation check at the end of the study, participants were asked to rate on a 10 
inch (25.4 cm) Visual Analog Scale (VAS) how they allocated their attention during the 
checking task.  The scale was anchored on the left with “I was paying attention only to the 
actions I was doing, and not at all to the surrounding environment,” on the right with “I was 
paying attention only to my surrounding environment, and not at all to my actions,” with the 
midpoint anchored by “My attention was equally divided between the actions I was doing and 
the surrounding environment.”  As such, low scores indicated that participants attended primarily 
to their actions, and higher scores indicated that participants attended to their surroundings.   
Difficulty 
 At the end of the study, participants were also asked to rate how difficult they found the 
task, using a 10 inch (25.4 cm) VAS scale to determine if the ‘cognitive load’ for peripheral and 
central groups was similar.   One end of the VAS scale was anchored by a very simple task, 
“Writing your full name in your dominant hand,” and the other end with a very difficult task, 
“Writing your full name in your dominant hand while spelling/saying the letters of your full 
 11
name in reverse order.”  The mid point was anchored by a moderately difficult task, “Writing 
your full name in your dominant hand while spelling/saying the letters of your name in order.”  
Thus, lower scores indicated that participants found the task to be fairly easy and higher scores 
indicated that participants found the task to be difficult. 
Procedure 
Participants first completed a questionnaire package which included the BAI, BDI-II, and 
VOCI.  They were then guided to the laboratory’s fully equipped kitchenette, where they were 
trained to “turn on,” “turn off,” and “check” various combinations of two out of six stove knobs 
in a ritualized, standardized manner.  The stove used in this experiment was an electric stove.  
Throughout the training and testing periods, all six plastic stove knobs were removed and 
participants had to use only one plastic knob to operate the stove.  This procedure is consistent 
with the procedure used by Radomsky and colleagues (2006), and Coles, and colleagues (2006), 
and was used to reduce the influence of visual checking because the cognitive component of 
checking was of primary interest in this study.  The knobs on the stove were numbered one 
through six, and a diagram clearly indicating the location of each knob was posted on the wall 
next to the stove.  To increase perceived responsibility and uncertainty, participants were told 
that the stove knobs were unreliable and that the experimenter would not be watching them 
check the stove.  It was emphasized to participants that it was their responsibility to ensure that 
the burners were off.   
Checking instructions were provided to the participants via an intercom.  For each trial, 
participants were first asked to “turn on,” “turn off,” and “check” two stove elements.  After each 
instruction was given (i.e., “turn on,” “turn off,” or “check”), participants were asked to walk 
over to the intercom to inform the experimenter that they had completed the task.   
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Prior to receiving the attention manipulation instructions, all participants completed a 
single checking trial.  Following this single check, participants were immediately taken into 
another room and answered the memory accuracy and confidence questions about the knobs that 
they checked following the single checking trial.    
After participants had answered the questions, they were brought back into the kitchen 
and were told that they had not properly turned off one of the burners.  Consistent with Van den 
Hout and Kindt (2004), this was done to increase the perceived probability of harm associated 
with the task. The importance of ensuring that the burners were off was emphasized by 
reminding them that “an unchecked stove can cause a fire.”  Participants were then told that they 
would be taken through a series of checking trials, and were offered a technique to help them 
remember which knobs they had indeed used.  Participants in the central condition were 
instructed to attend only to the act of checking.  These participants were told: 
Research demonstrates that focusing only on the actions of a task 
will improve your memory for the task at hand.  When you check the 
stove we want you to focus only on the act of checking the stove.  This 
means that if you only focus on your actions, your memory for checking 
the stove will improve.  It is very important for you to use this strategy of 
just focusing on the act of checking the stove throughout the set of 
operations. 
Participants in the peripheral condition were instructed to attend not only to the act of 
checking but also to their surroundings.  These participants were told that: 
Research demonstrates that focusing not only on the task at hand, 
but also on the surrounding context of that task will improve your memory 
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for the task.  When you check the stove we would like you to divide your 
attention equally between focusing on checking the stove and focusing on 
your surroundings.  This means that if you focus on the act of checking 
the stove and also on the objects in the room, your memory will improve.  
It is very important for you to use this strategy of focusing on the act of 
checking the stove and focusing on everything else in the room throughout 
the set of operations.  
The experimenter then left the room and proceeded to administer 30 checking trials via 
the intercom.  Each trial was composed of checks of two different knobs, and participants were 
randomly assigned to check one of two different sequences of knobs to control for order effects.  
After each block of 10 checking trials, participants were reminded of their focus strategy to 
ensure that the strategy was maintained throughout all trials.  The 30th and final trial was the 
same for all participants.   
 Once the 30 trials were completed, participants were taken into another room and given a 
distracter task of counting backwards in sevens from 4321 for 30 seconds to ensure that the last 
knobs checked were not held in working memory.  After this was completed, participants were 
asked the memory accuracy and confidence questions about the knobs checked following 
repeated checking, and about other central details, and peripheral details.  Finally, participants 
answered the manipulation check questions about attention and difficulty.    
Statistical Analyses 
 Two-way ANOVAs with group (high vs. low checkers) and focus condition (peripheral 
vs. central focus) as between-participant factors were used to examine memory accuracy and 
confidence for the knobs checked following a single check and following repeated checking, as 
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well as for other central items and peripheral items following a repeated check.  Partial eta 
squared (η2p ) was reported as a measure of effect size.  Significant interactions were followed up 
with pairwise comparisons that examined differences between the central and peripheral focus 
groups in high and low checkers respectively using a Bonferroni adjustment.  These pairwise 
comparisons were chosen not only because we were interested in examining if the focus 
condition had differing effects in high and low checkers, but also because this allowed for more 
equal sample sizes for our pairwise comparisons.  Additionally, ANOVAs were used to examine 
if there were differences in how difficult participants found the task to be, whether attentional 
focus varied across groups, and to compare the group scores on the BAI, BDI-II and VOCI (total 
and checking subscale) scores.   
Results 
Participants 
 Means and standard deviations of the self-report measures are presented in Table 1.  It is 
notable that the standard deviation on the VOCI checking subscale was much smaller in low 
checkers than high checkers.  Scores on this subscale ranged from 0 to 1 in the low checkers with 
most participants scoring 0.  In the high checkers, scores ranged from 4 to 24.  The majority of 
high checkers reported mild to moderate levels of checking.  There were neither significant 
differences for focus condition, Fs (1, 130) < .62, n.s., η2p s < .005 , nor significant interactions 
between focus condition and checking group, Fs (1, 130) < 1.27, n.s., η2ps = .01. High checkers 




 As expected, there was a significant effect of focus condition on reported attentional 
focus, F (1, 124) = 42.22, p < .001, η2p = .27, with the peripheral group dividing their attention 
equally between focusing on the task and on their surroundings (M = 4.49, SD = 1.34), and the 
central group focused more on the task than on their surroundings (M = 2.48, SD = 1.48).  There 
were no significant differences between the checking groups, F (1, 124) = .61, n.s., η2p = .005, 
nor was there a significant interaction between focus condition and checking group, F (1, 124) = 
.39, n.s., η2p = .003.  
Difficulty 
 There were no differences found with regards to how difficult participants perceived the 
task to be, Fs (1, 124) < 2.68, n.s., η2ps < .02.  On average participants reported finding the task 
to be fairly simple, as indicated by the overall mean falling below the half-way mark on the VAS 
scale (M = 3.90, SD = 2.58).  
Memory and Metamemory Following a Single Check 
 There was a trend for high checkers to show greater memory accuracy for the knobs 
checked following a single check compared to low checkers, F (1, 130) = 3.48, p < .06,  η2p  = 
.03. As anticipated, there were no significant differences between the focus conditions regarding 
memory accuracy for the knobs checked following a single check, F (1, 130) = .77, n.s., η2p = 
.006, nor was there a significant focus condition by checking group interaction, F (1, 130) = 
1.13, n.s., η2p = .009. 
 There was also a trend for high checkers to report lower memory confidence than low 
checkers following a single check, F (1, 130) = 3.77, p = .05, η2p  = .03.  However, this was 
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qualified by a trend for a focus condition by checking group interaction, F (1, 130) = 3.22, p = 
.08, η2p = .02.  Pairwise comparisons, however, demonstrated that there were no statistically 
significant differences between focus conditions for either the high or the low checkers. 
Confirming the equivalence of our focus condition groups prior to the attention manipulation, the 
main effect of focus condition was not significant, F (1, 130) = .23, n.s., η2p = .006.  Table 2 
presents the means and standard deviations for measures of memory confidence and accuracy. 
 Memory and Metamemory Following Repeated Checking 
 Memory and metamemory for the knobs 
 Analyses revealed a significant main effect of focus condition on memory accuracy, F (1, 
130) = 5.66, p < .05, η2p = .04.  As shown in Table 2, participants in the peripheral group were 
more accurate in their memory for the knobs checked than participants in the central group.  
There was no significant main effect of checking group on memory accuracy, F (1, 130) = 1.74, 
n.s., η2p = .01, nor was the group by condition interaction significant, F (1, 130) = 2.54, n.s., η2p  
= .02.   
For memory confidence, contrary to expectations, neither of the main effects, nor the 
interaction was significant, Fs (1, 130) < 2.22, n.s., η2ps < .02.  Table 3 presents the means and 
standard deviations for memory confidence. 
Because memory and metamemory for the knobs were the variables of interest, we 
conducted post hoc comparisons between the central and peripheral conditions within the high 
checkers only to determine if the attention manipulation had any effect on memory accuracy or 
metamemory in the high checkers.  Consistent with the results reported for the entire sample, 
high checkers in the peripheral condition had a significantly more accurate memory for the knobs 
checked compared to high checkers in the central condition, t (26) = -2.25, p < .05, η2p = .16, but 
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were not significantly different from each other on memory confidence for the knobs checked, t 
(26) = .98, n.s., η2p = .04. 
 Memory for other central items 
 As shown in Table 2, the main effect of focus condition on accuracy was significant, with 
participants in the peripheral condition being more accurate at recalling other central items than 
participants in the central condition, F (1, 130) = 5.01, p < .05, η2p = .04.  The main effect of 
checking group was not significant, F (1, 130) = .02, n.s., η2p = .0001, however the interaction 
between focus condition and checking group for memory accuracy for other central items was 
significant, F (1, 130) = 5.43, p < .05,  η2p = .04.  Pairwise comparisons revealed that high 
checkers in the peripheral condition had a more accurate memory for other central items than 
high checkers in the central condition, but there was no difference between the focus conditions 
among low checkers.  
As demonstrated in Table 2, a similar pattern was observed for memory confidence for 
the other central items.  Participants in the peripheral condition had significantly greater memory 
confidence than participants in the central condition for other central items, F (1, 130) = 4.98, p 
< .05,  η2p = .04.     The main effect of checking group was not significant, F (1, 130) = .87, n.s., 
η2p = .007, nor was the interaction between checking group and focus condition, F (1, 130) = 
2.36, n.s., η2p = .02.   
Memory and metamemory for peripheral items 
 The peripheral group correctly recalled a significantly greater percentage of peripheral 
items than the central group, F (1, 130) = 29.95, p < .0001, η2p = .18.  There was no significant 
main effect of checking group, F (1, 130) =  1.12, n.s., η2p = .009, nor was there a significant 
focus condition by checking group interaction, F (1, 130) = 1.64, n.s., η2p = .01. 
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 As shown in Table 2, participants in the peripheral condition gave significantly higher 
ratings of memory confidence than participants in the central condition, F (1, 130) = 33.80, p < 
.0001, η2p = .21.  There was no significant difference between the checking groups, F (1, 130) = 
.26, n.s., η2p = .002, nor was there a significant condition by group interaction, F (1, 130) = .89, 
n.s., η2p = .007. 
Controlling for depression 
 Because scores on the BDI-II were greater for high checkers than low checkers, we were 
concerned that some of the differences between the groups may be attributable to differences in 
depression, particularly given the fact that depression has been associated with memory biases  
(see Dalgleish & Watts, 1990 for a review).  We therefore reran the analyses controlling for BDI-
II scores using ANCOVAs with focus condition and checking status as between-participant 
factors.  Results were the same as described above, except that the trend for the effect of 
checking group on memory confidence for the knobs checked following a single check was no 
longer significant, F (1, 128) = 1.82, p = .18, η2p = .01. 
Discussion  
This study found that in a repeated checking task, instructions to attend not only to one’s 
actions but also to one’s surroundings (compared to instructions to attend only to one’s actions) 
led to a more accurate memory for the knobs that were last checked, but did not influence 
confidence in memory.  Not surprisingly, peripheral focus also led to more accurate memory and 
greater memory confidence for items that were increasingly peripheral to the act of checking 
(e.g., other central items and peripheral items).  The benefits of peripheral focus on memory 
accuracy, particularly for other central items, seemed to be greatest in the high checking group.  
Before repeated checking began, high checkers had a more accurate memory than low checkers 
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for which knobs they checked, but were less confident in their memory for checking the stove.  
The implications of these findings will be considered separately. 
Effects of attentional focus on memory confidence 
Van den Hout and Kindt (2004) argued that declines in memory confidence following 
repeated checking occur because of decreased encoding of detail during repeated checking. We 
therefore tested the hypothesis that increasing the amount of (albeit peripheral) detail encoded 
during repeated checking may attenuate the distrust in memory.  Our findings did not support 
this hypothesis.  Memory confidence for recalling the knobs checked was not influenced by 
instructions to attend to one’s actions and surroundings, but these instructions did result in 
greater memory confidence for items in the room (e.g., other central items and peripheral items).   
One explanation for why memory confidence did not improve may be because our 
manipulation of attention was ineffective.  However, the attention manipulation check suggests 
that participants in the peripheral focus condition did attend to their surroundings and their 
actions, whereas participants in the central focus condition attended only to their actions.  
Furthermore, peripheral focus did result in better memory and memory confidence for 
increasingly peripheral items (e.g., other central items and peripheral items), suggesting that our 
manipulation was effective.   
An alternative explanation is that the instructions to attend to “objects in the room” may 
have led participants to have a better memory and memory confidence for items in the room, but 
not necessarily for the act of checking itself.  Perhaps instructions to attend to the context of 
one’s actions may have resulted in improved memory confidence for the knobs last checked.   
Recalling the specific context of a single checking event (e.g., remembering that one walked 
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back to the stove to check) may increase the elaboration and distinctiveness of encoding which 
should assist in memory retrieval (Craik & Lockhart, 1972; Lockhart & Craik, 1990). 
Effects of attentional focus on memory accuracy 
One surprising and interesting effect of the peripheral focus instruction was to increase 
participants’ memory accuracy for the knobs checked, as well as for other central items and 
peripheral items. One possible reason why the peripheral focus group exhibited greater memory 
accuracy for central items is that when attending to central details, the peripheral focus group 
may have had fewer involuntary rest pauses (IRPs) than the central focus group.  An IRP is 
defined as a pause in performance (or in this case a lapse in attention) which is hypothesized to 
occur in order to dissipate reactive inhibition during a task (Eysenck, 1967).  Studies using 
vigilance tasks suggest that missed responses on such tasks are a result of an IRP occurring 
concurrently with the stimulus.  It may be that instructions to focus on peripheral details served 
as a forced rest pause, thereby reducing the likelihood of an IRP during central focus.  This 
hypothesis is consistent with findings that adding a secondary vigilance task results in 
improvements in a primary task (Bakan, 1959).  Thus memory for central detail may have 
improved in the peripheral focus condition because of a decreased need for IRPs.   
The benefits of peripheral focus appear to apply to both high checkers and low checkers, 
at least with respect to memory accuracy for the knobs checked.  In fact, peripheral focus 
instructions appeared to have a larger effect on high checkers than low checkers.  In the 
peripheral condition, high checkers exhibited a more accurate memory for other central items 
compared to high checkers in the central condition, and to low checkers in both conditions.  
Peripheral focus instructions may have led participants to focus on details around the room, 
instead of the overall context of the room.  Savage and colleagues (2000) demonstrated that 
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individuals with OCD tend to focus on the details of a complex figure as opposed to focusing on 
the overall structure of the figure.  Focusing on the specific details may have improved recall for 
these details (including which knobs they checked), rather than increasing perceptual salience of 
the checking event.  Our instructions may have actually encouraged high checkers to use 
ineffective encoding strategies they already employ (e.g., focusing on individual details in the 
room) rather than encouraging them to focus on the context of checking as an integrated whole.  
While the peripheral encoding strategy may have improved memory for the knobs checked, it 
may not have had any impact on metamemory as it did not increase the distinctiveness of each 
check. 
Differences between high and low checkers before repeated checking 
 Following a single check (but not repeated checks), high checkers exhibited greater 
memory accuracy for the knobs checked than low checkers, even after controlling for symptoms 
of depression.  This memory bias is consistent with other studies that demonstrate an explicit 
memory bias in OCD for threat-relevant information (e.g., checking to make sure the stove is 
off) under ecologically valid conditions (Radomsky & Rachman, 1999; Radomsky et al., 2001).  
One possible reason for why such biases are not consistently detected is that repeated checking 
perhaps degrades the quality of recall, thereby masking memory biases that may initially be 
present.   
Additionally, consistent with Rachman’s (2002) model of compulsive checking, high 
checkers tended to report lower memory confidence prior to repeated checking compared to low 
checkers (although this difference was not apparent after controlling for depression).  It may be 
that an initial distrust in memory is what motivates individuals to begin to check repeatedly.  The 
fact that differences between high and low checkers in memory confidence disappeared after 
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repeated checking suggests that checkers and non-checkers are both influenced by decreases in 
vividness and detail that result from repeated checking.  Future research should investigate the 
factors that contribute to the initial distrust in memory observed in high checkers.  
Changes in memory confidence and accuracy following repeated checking 
Although we did not systematically examine changes in memory accuracy and confidence 
from a single check to repeated checks, because the focus manipulation occurred in between the 
single check and the repeated checking trials, an examination of the differences between means 
of memory accuracy and confidence for the burners checked suggests that both memory 
confidence and memory accuracy declined.  This is consistent with previous work demonstrating 
that repeated checking leads to distrust in memory (Coles et al., 2006; Van den Hout & Kindt, 
2003a, 2003b, 2004; Radomsky et al., 2006).  However, the decline in memory accuracy for the 
knobs checked is inconsistent with findings by Van den Hout and Kindt (2003a, 2003b, 2004), 
but consistent with results from Radomsky et al. (2006), and Coles et al., (2006), and supports 
the idea that repeated checking may reduce the salience of encoded threat-relevant information, 
and subsequent recall of these events.    
Findings from this study support Radomsky and colleague’s assertion that declines in 
memory accuracy following repeated checking may be observed only under more ecologically 
valid conditions.  Additional possible explanations for memory accuracy reductions could 
include: participants performed 30 checks, rather than 20 checks as in previous studies; 
participants were asked to use an attentional strategy while checking; and, participants were 
asked to recall not only which knobs they checked but also in which order they were checked.   
Summary and Implications 
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Although there are some limitations that warrant mention, one important strength of this 
study is that it is consistent with a recent call for studies using ecologically valid research 
protocols to investigate memory and related phenomena in association with OCD (Radomsky & 
Rachman, 2004).  In an attempt to maintain the integrity of testing, this paradigm required the 
standardization of the checking task which may have reduced the ecological validity to some 
extent.  Nevertheless, this task is of greater ecological validity than previous experiments on 
memory and metamemory in OCD that utilized paradigms such as neuropsychological tests 
(Rubenstein, et al., 1993; Sher, et al., 1983, 1984, 1989; Tallis, et al., 1999).   
To date, several studies have successfully used this protocol in a non-clinical population to 
examine the effects of repeated checking (Coles et al., in press; Radomsky et al., in press; Van 
den Hout & Kindt, 2003a, 2003b, 2004).  There is now a need to establish the utility of this 
paradigm in a clinical sample.  Our results from an analogue sample of high checkers suggest 
that this paradigm may be useful in a clinical sample.  The mean VOCI checking subscale score 
of the high checking group fell just below that of compulsive checkers in the initial validation of 
the VOCI (Thordarson et al., 2004), suggesting that our sample of high checkers falls in the non-
clinical range. While OCD symptomatology likely exists along a continuum (Rachman & de 
Silva, 1978; Gibbs, 1996), it may be that people who engage in more pronounced compulsive 
checking would have been more strongly influenced by our manipulation.  We did not include a 
“no attention” group in our design, so it may be difficult to conclude from this study what effect 
repeated checking has on memory and metamemory without manipulating attention.  However, 
several previous studies have clearly demonstrated that repeated checking does lead to 
decrements in memory confidence, and in some cases also to declines in memory accuracy 
(Coles et al., in press; Radomsky et al., in press; Van den Hout & Kindt, 2003a, 2003b, 2004). 
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There are several important implications of this study.  First, results speak against the 
hypothesis that compulsive checking is associated with memory deficits.  These findings add to 
the mounting evidence suggesting that people with OCD may be more accurate in recalling 
personally relevant, anxiety provoking information (Ceschi et al., 2003; Constans, et al., 1995; 
Radomsky & Rachman, 1999; Radomsky et al., 2001; Tolin, et al., 2001; Wilhelm, et al., 1996).  
Results of the current study further suggest that the act of repeated checking may reduce our 
ability to detect these biases.  
This is one of the first attempts to examine how attention influences memory and 
metamemory in repeated checking in an ecologically valid experimental paradigm.  Although we 
were unsuccessful in attenuating decrements in memory confidence for the knobs last checked, 
our instructions to attend to one’s actions and details around the room did increase memory 
confidence for items around the room, and more interestingly improved memory accuracy 
overall.   Future research should examine if increasing encoding of the context of a specific 
checking event, rather than the encoding of details present during checking, will increase the 
distinctiveness and richness of memory, and subsequently have a greater impact on memory 
confidence than our peripheral focus instructions.  
Finally, this study demonstrated in an analog sample that high checkers are influenced by 
repeated checking in the same way as a normative sample.  That is participants, including high 
and low checkers, responded to repeated checking with decreased confidence in and accuracy of 
memory.  Furthermore, increasing the scope of attentional focus by attending to one’s 
surroundings as well as to one’s actions appears to improve memory accuracy in both groups.  
This knowledge may help clinicians to develop cognitive-behavioral interventions that 
demonstrate to compulsive checkers the effects that repeated checking have on memory accuracy 
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and confidence, and the effects that shifting attentional focus can have on memory accuracy.  It 
is hoped that continued advancements in our understanding of the complex interrelationships 
between OCD, memory, attention and metamemory will help to improve our ability to provide 
psychoeducation about cognition, and cognition-based behavioral interventions for OCD. 
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 Table 1. 
Mean scores (SD) on measures of OCD symptomatology, anxiety, and depression in high and 
low checkers. 




n = 14 
Central  
n = 14 
Total 
n = 28 
Peripheral 
n = 54 
Central  
n = 52 
Total 
n = 106 
 
N = 134 
























































a VOCI refers to the Vancouver Obsessional Compulsive Inventory (Thordarson, et al., 2004). 
b BAI refers to the Beck Anxiety Inventory (Beck, Epstein, Brown, & Steer, 1988). 
c BDI-II refers to the Beck Depression Inventory Second Edition (Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996). 
* SD are presented in brackets below the mean scores. 
Means with differing subscripts are significantly different at p < .05.
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Table 2. 
Mean (SD) memory accuracy and metamemory following single and repeated checking trials. 
  Peripheral Condition Central Condition 
















































 Memory Confidence for Other Central Items 87.26+ 85.26+ 74.79o 82.96o 
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(9.82) (13.03) (23.18) (16.78) 





















Items included within each category. 
Category Question Correct Answer 
Knobs Checked On the last trial, which knob did you check first? Knob  # 6 
 On the last trial, which knob did you check second? Knob  # 1 
Peripheral Items What kind of food or drink was by the stove? Coke can 
 How many electrical plugs were on the stove? 1 
 What colour was the tea towel on the stove? Pink 
 What pattern was on the tea pot Flowers 
 How many cups were there in the sink? 4 
Other Central 
Items 
Which knob did not click loudly 2 
 Did any burners glow/red/orange while you were in the 
kitchen? 
No 
 Did the stove beep at anytime? No 
Single Check Which knob did you check first? Knob # 2 
 Which knob did you check second? Knob # 5 
 
